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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
 
This paper studies the effects of the United States’ (US) quantitative easing on 
Asia by examining capital flows and financial markets. After the global financial 
crisis, Asian economies with more open and developed capital markets 
experienced greater swings in capital inflows. In particular, large capital flows 
were manifest more in portfolio investment and other investment such as bank 
loans than in foreign direct investment. Empirical analysis shows quantitative 
easing, in particular the first round, significantly contributed to the rebounding of 
capital inflows to the region after the onset of the crisis by lowering domestic 
yield rates as well as credit default swap premiums. Although the currency value 
responses differed across countries, it appears that economies with stable 
exchange rates roughly coincide with those in which housing prices have been 
rising, suggesting that monetary easing of advanced countries have affected 
Asian countries through either appreciation of currency values or increases in the 
prices of housing. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: quantitative easing, monetary policy, Asian impacts 
 
JEL classification: E52, E58 
  
 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
As the global financial crisis (GFC) unfolded, advanced economies relied heavily on 
expansionary monetary and fiscal policy to stabilize markets. However, with credit constraints 
so severe and nominal interest rates nearing the zero lower bound, traditional monetary policy 
proved inadequate. Advanced economies thus resorted to employing unconventional measures 
to increase money supply, which involved not only the active management of the size and 
composition of central bank balance sheets, but also nontraditional mechanisms for central 
bank operations. In particular, the United States (US) launched three rounds of historically 
unprecedented quantitative easing (QE) since the GFC erupted in 2008, resulting in an 
enormous expansion of the Federal Reserve’s (Fed) balance sheet of almost threefold in 3 
years.  
 
The impacts of such unconventional monetary policy measures have become 
increasingly controversial. Advanced economies are of the view that unconventional 
expansionary monetary policy stabilizes financial markets and promotes growth, therefore its 
global effects must be positive. On the other hand, emerging economies are concerned about 
its negative spillover effects on their capital flows, exchange rates, and asset prices. For 
example, Brazil’s Finance Minister Guido Mantega went as far as raising alarm bells over a 
“currency war” in 2010 to describe how the Federal Reserve’s QE was raising the values of 
emerging market economies’ currencies. This has prompted the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) to come out with regular spillover reports for G20 meetings. With the recent 
announcement by the Japanese government of aggressive unconventional monetary policy, 
such fears of emerging economies have resurfaced. 
 
While it is generally accepted in the literature that QE was effective in lowering US long-
term yield rates and stimulating economic activity, evidence on their international spillover 
effects are somewhat mixed.1 In this context, this paper examines the empirical impact of US 
QE on Asian economies, since Japan’s QE has only recently been announced. The analysis 
consists of two parts: (i) trend analysis of capital flow aggregates and their composition; and 
(ii) regression analysis to more directly examine the effects on domestic financial variables. 
 
From capital flow data, we found that inflows were extremely volatile around the GFC. In 
the depth of global financial turmoil, aggregate capital inflows to 10 large regional economies2 
plummeted to 1.7% of gross domestic product (GDP) in 2008–2009 from an average of 8.4% 
the previous 3 years. Faced with sudden liquidity shortages due to the drastic sell-offs of foreign 
investors from Asian equity and bond markets, Asian residents responded by withdrawing their 
external loans including public reserves until the liquidity situation improved. QE seems to have 
significantly contributed to the improvement of the liquidity situation by encouraging the return of 
capital flows into Asia. Indeed, inflows rebounded nearly as sharply, returning to an average of 
7.8% of GDP in 2010–2012. It is noticeable that the wild fluctuation of capital inflows around the 
GFC was mainly driven by portfolio investment, while foreign direct investment (FDI) was 
robust. In particular, the economies with more open and developed capital markets experienced 
greater swings in portfolio investment.  
 
From the regression analyses, we found that while the effects of the second and third 
rounds of QE were relatively muted, the first round had pronounced effects in lowering domestic 
                                                
1  Related literature is reviewed in Section II. 
2  The 10 economies are the People’s Republic of China (PRC); Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Japan; the 
Republic of Korea; the Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand. 
2   І   ADB Economics Working Paper Series No. 350 
interest rates, containing sovereign risk premiums, and appreciating local currencies in Asia. In 
addition, Asia’s financial variables were significantly affected by global variables such as US 
interest rates and the VIX index, which implies that Asia’s financial conditions were loosened by 
QE to the extent that QE affected the global variables. In fact, housing prices have been sharply 
rising in some Asian countries where exchange rates have been stable or rigid. This trade-off 
relationship between exchange rate and housing price suggests that monetary easing in 
advanced economies has affected Asian economies through either currency appreciation or 
asset price inflation. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly explains how the US quantitative 
easing policy has been carried out and surveys existing literature on its effects. Section III 
overviews trends of capital flow aggregates and their composition, and Section IV discusses 
regression analysis results to more directly examine the effects on Asia’s domestic financial 
variables. Section V adds comments on the movements of housing prices, and Section VI 
concludes with some policy suggestions.  
 
 
II. QUANTITATIVE EASING OF THE US  
 
As the sub-prime mortgage crisis deepened and the economy slowed down in 2007, many 
segments of capital markets became dysfunctional. In order to support these market segments 
experiencing liquidity shortages, the Fed introduced several facilities since December 2007,3 
which changed the composition, rather than the size, of the Fed’s balance sheet. 
 
 
Figure 1: Fed’s Asset ($ trillion) 
 
 
  
                                                
3  The Term Auction Facility (TAF), the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF), and the Primary Dealer Credit 
Facility (PDCF) were established. 
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Upon the global financial panic triggered by the Lehman collapse in September 2008, 
however, the Fed’s balance sheet expanded sharply. As Figure 1 shows, the total asset of the 
Fed increased from below $1 trillion before the Lehman collapse to almost $2 trillion by October, 
just in a month. Main components of the increase were still emergency liquidity provision 
facilities (including central bank liquidity swaps) as well as support for specific financial 
institutions in trouble.  
 
As the interest rate was lowered to the zero bound and the economic recession became 
evident, the Fed announced a large-scale asset purchase (LSAP) program in November 2008, 
which was extended in 2009.4 This allowed the Fed to expand its open market operations and 
support credit markets through the purchase of longer-term securities. The announced total 
amount of asset purchases was $1.7 trillion, which, according to Chen et al. (2012) represented 
22% of the combined outstanding Treasuries, long-term agency debt, and fixed rate agency 
mortgage-backed securities (MBS) at the beginning of the operation. This LSAP was carried out 
between November 2008 and March 2009 during the GFC, and extended to March 2010. As a 
result, the securities held by the Fed skyrocketed from $0.5 trillion in November 2008 to $2 
trillion in March 2010, maintaining the total asset size despite the reduction of emergency 
liquidity provision facilities. 
 
On 3 November 2010, the Fed again announced an additional purchase of $600 billion 
of longer-term treasury securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011 as the global 
recovery faltered with the euro crisis. This action, which pushed up the Fed’s total asset size to 
almost $3 trillion, is commonly dubbed as QE2. On 12 September 2012, the Fed decided to 
launch a new $40 billion a month, open-ended, bond purchase program of agency MBS and 
also to continue the extremely low rates policy until at least mid-2015. This policy, QE3, was 
intended to lower borrowing costs and ease credit conditions for the private sector to promote 
growth and employment as the crisis subsided. The Fed’s total asset finally broke $3 trillion as 
of January 2013. 
 
The QE policy is assessed to have largely succeeded at achieving their intended 
domestic goals―restoring financial market functioning and reducing tail risks―at the time of the 
great financial turmoil, in particular. For example, Sack (2010) discussed how the emergency 
liquidity provision facilities including the Term Asset Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF) 
revitalized transactions in the securitized credit markets, and Mancini-Griffoli and Ranaldo 
(2010) showed that cross-border money market arbitrage opportunities were restored as soon 
as the exchange swap lines were established. Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) 
estimated that QE1 decreased MBS yields by 150 basis points, and Hancock and Passmore 
(2011) estimated that its effect on the mortgage rate was almost 50 bps.5 To the extent that QEs 
reduced long-term interest rates and credit spreads, it is believed that they also helped the 
economy to recover. Employing counterfactual simulation exercises of various macroeconomic 
models, some researchers actually reported positive macroeconomic effects although the 
results need to be appreciated with caution.6  
 
                                                
4  More specifically, the Fed announced purchases of $100 billion in government-sponsored enterprise (GSE)-debt 
and up to $500 billion in mortgage-backed securities (MBS) on 25 November 2008, and the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) statement first mentioned possible purchase of long-term Treasuries on 16 December 2008. 
On 18 March 2009, the FOMC announced that it would purchase an additional $750 billion in agency MBS and 
increase its purchase of agency debt and long-term Treasuries by $100 billion and $300 billion, respectively. 
5  As for the impacts of QE on US long-term yield rates, also see Ihrig et al. (2012), D’Amico and King (2012), and 
Gagnon et al. (2010, 2011).  
6  See, for example, Baumeister and Benati (2010), Chung et. al. (2012), and Chen et. al. (2012).  
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As for international spillover effects, it is consistently found that QE (in particular, the first 
round) was also effective in lowering bond yield rates in other countries. After Neely (2010) first 
reported substantial impacts of QE1 on yield rates in other advanced countries, the IMF (2011) 
estimated that a 100 basis point lower US long bond yield was associated with a 150 basis point 
decline in emerging market yields in QE1 but less than a 50 basis point fall in QE2. Chen et al. 
(2012) also reported that the cumulative impact of US QE was to lower emerging market Asian 
bond yields, boost equity prices, and exert upward pressure on bilateral exchange rates against 
the US dollar. 
 
Looking at capital flow data of the US, however, the IMF (2012) found that there was no 
significant sign of US liquidity heading out of the US. While net capital flows to emerging 
countries are almost back to their peak levels before the GFC, US net external purchases of 
stocks and bonds were generally lower than before the crisis until 2010. Nevertheless, this is 
not definitive evidence that US QE policy had no effect on US dollar capital flows to Asia or 
other emerging market economies. Chen et al. (2012) pointed out that while total outflows of 
capital from the US have not been exceptional during the US QE period, additional dollar 
funding in Asia originating outside the US could come from international financial centers such 
as Hong Kong, China and Singapore.  
 
 
III. CAPITAL FLOW TRENDS  
 
To understand whether US expansionary monetary policy has increased capital flows into Asia 
or changed their composition, the first step is to compare trends before and after the GFC. 
Extraordinary movements in capital flows, if any are found, cannot be attributed solely to QE, as 
these could be driven by a multitude of other factors. The trend analysis simply identifies 
noticeable changes after QE that policy makers may need to be concerned about, though the 
causes may not be clearly identified. 
 
A. Capital Inflows 
 
Figure 1 shows aggregate private capital inflows 7  to 10 Asian economies 8  since 2005. In 
Figure 2(a), the aggregate size of capital inflows to the region, most pronounced is the volatility. 
Inflows rapidly increased to over $1.4 trillion in 2007 and collapsed with the GFC in 2008 and 
2009. It then sharply rebounded to the pre-crisis level in 2010 and 2011 when the global 
economy recovered along with the QE, and then slowed down after the second half of 2011 
when the European crisis escalated.9 While Figure 2(a) shows that approximately half of the 
aggregate capital inflows were accounted for by the G2, i.e., the People’s Republic of China 
(PRC) and Japan, Figure 2(b) shows that the volatility of capital inflows was perceptible in most 
Asian countries.  
 
  
                                                
7  Aggregate private capital inflows are defined as the sum of the ‘Direct Investment’, ‘Portfolio Investment’ 
(including ‘Derivatives’), and ‘Other Investment’ inflows in financial accounts. For India, data refer to ‘Direct 
Investment’, ‘Portfolio Investment’, ‘Loans’, ‘Banking Capital’, ‘Rupee Debt Service’, and ‘Other Capital’. 
8  The 10 Asian economies are the PRC; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Japan; the Republic of Korea; the 
Philippines; Singapore; Taipei,China; and Thailand.  
9  This finding is consistent with Morgan (2011), who argues that excess portfolio inflows to emerging Asia were 
higher during the QE1 period than during the QE2 period. 
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By presenting the average of the capital inflow to GDP ratios, Figure 2(b) suppresses the 
dominating effects of the G2 economies, but instead exaggerates the influence of the region’s 
financial hubs, Hong Kong, China and Singapore, as their capital inflows are extremely large 
relative to their GDP. In the depth of the GFC, capital inflows to these 10 countries plummeted 
to 1.7% of GDP in 2008–2009 from an average of 8.4% in the previous 3 years. But inflows 
rebounded nearly as sharply, returning to an average of 7.8% of GDP in 2010–2012. The same 
pattern is observed even excluding Hong Kong, China and Singapore. Capital inflows collapsed 
from 6.3% of GDP on average in 2005–2007 to 1.9% in 2008–2009, and recovered to 6.4% in 
2010–2012, nearly equal to the pre-crisis level. 
 
 
Figure 2: Private Capital Inflows to Asia 
 
 
G2 = Hong Kong, China and Singapore; hubs = PRC and Japan. 
Note: Ratios are weighted averages of the GDP ratios for individual countries.  
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
 
 
Figure 3 shows the composition of capital inflows for all countries excluding Hong Kong, 
China and Singapore. It is noticeable that while FDI was robust around the GFC, portfolio 
investment was most volatile, collapsing from 2.2% of GDP in 2007 to –2.9% in 2008, as 
foreigners sold off Asian equities and bonds. Another noteworthy observation is that other 
inflows, which are mostly bank loans, exceeded the pre-crisis level and became the main 
source of capital inflows after the GFC. Meanwhile, the ratio of FDI slipped in 2012, and the 
ratio of portfolio investment has not fully recovered to the pre-crisis level.  
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Figure 3: Components of Private Capital Inflows to Asia  
(Excluding Hong Kong, China and Singapore) 
 
 
Note: Ratios are weighted averages of the GDP ratios for individual countries.  
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
 
 
Figure 4 shows the composition of capital inflows by individual country. For the two 
financial hubs, capital inflows easily exceed 10% of GDP, mainly driven by other investment. 
Patterns of capital inflows to the G2 economies— the PRC and Japan—are in stark contrast: 
whereas capital inflows to the PRC are mainly FDI and have been relatively smooth, the main 
component of capital inflow fluctuations in Japan are portfolio investment. This difference 
between the PRC and Japan seems to reflect their differing degree of financial market 
liberalization. The relatively open financial markets of the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China 
experienced patterns similar to Japan’s, in that portfolio investment drove the wild swings in 
capital inflows around the GFC. In other Asian economies (except India), the role of portfolio 
investment was relatively weak and the amplitude of fluctuation was relatively small, while the 
patterns were similar. 
 
In sum, capital inflows to Asia went through drastic fluctuations around the GFC, driven 
mainly by portfolio investments into countries with relatively open financial markets. In particular, 
the quick rebound of capital inflows in 2010, despite the heightened uncertainties and massive 
credit constraints of financial institutions in advanced economies, suggests that QE contributed 
to stabilizing the global financial market and turning capital flows back to Asia. 
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Figure 4: Components of Capital Inflows to Individual Countries (% of GDP) 
 
 
Note: For India, data for ‘Other Investment’ are composed of ‘Loans’, ‘Banking Capital’, ‘Rupee Debt Service’, and ‘Other Capital’. 
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
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B. Capital Outflows, Net Flows, and Foreign Reserves 
 
Figure 5 presents the composition of capital outflows (negative values) for all countries 
excluding Hong Kong, China and Singapore, which is comparable to Figure 3. An interesting 
difference from Figure 3 is that other investment was more volatile than portfolio investment 
around the GFC period, suggesting that Asian residents were not as exposed to external capital 
markets as foreign investors were to Asian markets. This conjecture seems to be supported by 
the fact that portfolio outflows were more volatile in the countries with more liberalized capital 
markets such as the Republic of Korea and Taipei,China (not shown).  
 
 
Figure 5: Components of Private Capital Outflows from Asia 
(Excluding Hong Kong, China and Singapore) 
 
 
Note: Ratios are weighted averages of the GDP ratios for individual countries.  
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
 
 
The different response of portfolio investment from that of other investment becomes 
more evident in net private capital flows, presented in Figure 6. Whereas net portfolio 
investment collapsed to –2.1% of GDP in 2008, net other investment increased in 2008 and 
further rose to 2.1% of GDP in 2009. These contrasting movements seem to indicate that, faced 
with sudden liquidity shortages due to the drastic sell-offs of foreign investors from Asian equity 
and bond markets in 2008, Asian residents responded by accessing external loans rather than 
selling external assets.  
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Figure 6: Components of Net Private Capital Inflows 
(Excluding Hong Kong, China and Singapore) 
 
 
G2 = Hong Kong, China and Singapore; hubs = PRC and Japan. 
Note: Ratios are weighted averages of the GDP ratios for individual countries.  
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
 
 
However, the response to the sudden withdrawal of portfolio investment upon the GFC 
was more immediately made by the public rather than private sectors. Figure 7 shows that, 
excluding the G2, reserve accumulation (negative value) fell to 0.9% of GDP in 2008 from 3.9% 
in the previous year, and then tremendously increased to 7.1% in 2009 as the liquidity situation 
of private sectors improved with QE. This active countercyclical response of the public reserve 
around the GFC was most prominent in the Republic of Korea whose reserves shrank by 6.9% 
of GDP in 2008 but increased by 7.5% in 2009 (not shown). Yet, the PRC has been a dominant 
player in the whole region, accounting for 70%–80% of the total (approximately $700 billion of 
the $900 billion total per year) accumulated by the 10 sample economies from 2007 to 2011, 
although this pace substantially slowed down in 2012.  
 
 
Figure 7: Reserve Accumulation 
 
 
G2 = Hong Kong, China and Singapore; hubs = PRC and Japan. 
Note: Ratios are weighted averages of the GDP ratios for individual countries.  
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
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In terms of net aggregate financial account that includes reserve accumulation as well as 
private capital inflows and outflows, most Asian economies (except India) were capital exporters 
(outflows larger than inflows) prior to the GFC mainly due to the sizable amounts of reserve 
accumulation. After the GFC, however, the amount of capital export was shrinking in most 
countries, which may be related to the global rebalancing process.  
 
 
Figure 8: Net Aggregate Financial Account 
 
 
G2 = Hong Kong, China and Singapore; hubs = PRC and Japan. 
Note: Ratios are weighted averages of the GDP ratios for individual countries.  
Source: Authors’ calculations from CEIC Data Company Ltd. 
 
 
IV. REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
 
A. QE and Global Variables 
 
The review of trends before and after the GFC has severe limitations as the impact of QE 
cannot be clearly identified. To analyze the impacts of QE more rigorously, regression analyses 
using weekly data10 were carried out. As proxies for QE, 10 dummy variables (E1–E10) for the 
weeks of important QE announcements were used. 
 
 
  
                                                
10  Every Wednesday quotes (Thursday if Wednesday quote is not available, Tuesday if Thursday is not available 
either) were used, and for Asian countries’ data, one-day lagged data were used. Sample period is 2003–2012. 
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Table 1: Event Dummies 
 
 Dummy 
Variable 
Event Date Event
QE1 E1 25 Nov 2008 The Federal Reserve announces purchases of $100 billion in GSE debt and 
up to $500 billion in MBS. 
E2 1 Dec 2008 Chairman Bernanke mentions that the Federal Reserve could purchase long-
term Treasuries. 
E3 16 Dec 2008 FOMC statement first mentions possible purchase of long-term Treasuries. 
E4 28 Jan 2009 FOMC statement says that it is ready to expand agency debt and MBS 
purchases, as well as to purchase long-term Treasuries. 
E5 18 Mar 2009 FOMC announces that it will purchase additional $750 billion in agency MBS 
and increase its purchase of agency debt and long-term Treasuries by $100 
billion and $300 billion, respectively. 
QE2 E6 3 Nov 2010 The Federal Reserve announces purchase of $600 billion of Treasury 
securities by the end of the second quarter of 2011. 
E7 13 Jul 2011 Chairman Bernanke says, "The Federal Reserve is ready to ease monetary 
policy further if economic growth and inflation slow much more."  
QE3 E8 31 Aug 2012 Chairman Bernanke mentions that the Federal Reserve is ready to 
additionally act, and purchase long-term Treasuries. 
E9 12 Sep 2012 The Federal Reserve decides to launch a new $40 billion a month, open-
ended, bond purchase program of agency MBS and also to continue the 
extremely low rates policy until at least mid-2015. 
E10 12 Dec 2012 FOMC decides to continue its purchases of agency MBS and longer-term 
Treasury securities at a pace of $40 billion and $45 billion, respectively. 
FOMC = Federal Open Market Committee, GSE = government-sponsored enterprises, MBS = mortgage-backed securities,  
QE1 = first round of quantitative easing, QE2 = second round of quantitative easing, QE3 = third round of quantitative easing. 
Source: Neely (2010) for E1–E5 and Federal Reserve Board Homepage for E6–E10. 
 
 
Along with these event dummies, USRATE (yield rate on 5-year US Treasuries) and 
VIX11 (index of global investor sentiment and market volatility) were also considered. Of course, 
USRATE and VIX cannot be sharp proxies of QE policy as they are affected by a large number 
of other factors. However, we believe that these variables can help provide a full picture of QE 
effects because the literature consistently reports that QE succeeded in lowering US long-term 
yield rates and tail risks of the global financial market.  
 
Before examining the effects of the QE variables on Asia, mutual relationships among 
these variables were briefly checked through regressions of USRATE, VIX, and oil price 
(DUBAI) on QE dummy variables. Table 2 reports the results. 
 
  
                                                
11 VIX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index, which provides “a key measure of market 
expectations of near-term volatility conveyed by S&P500 stock index option prices” 
(http://www.cboe.com/micro/VIX/vixintro.aspx). 
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Table 2: QE and Global Indicators 
 
 USRATE VIX DUBAI 
Const. –0.001 0.000 0.000 0.242 0.247 0.258 
USRATE – – –0.063*** –   3.420** 1.272 
VIX –     –33.749*** 
QE1 E1 –0.069  –0.194*** –0.198*** –1.011  –0.776 –7.465 
E2 –0.409***  0.058* 0.032 –12.268*** –10.871**   –9.805** 
E3 –0.269* –0.059** –0.076***  10.587** 11.505**   8.926** 
E4 0.101 –0.068** –0.062**  8.439* 8.092* 6.015 
E5 –0.419*** –0.036 –0.062**  7.682*  9.114** 7.003 
QE2 E6 –0.229* –0.012 –0.026  4.216 4.998 4.105 
E7 –0.209  0.035 0.022  4.022 4.735 5.478 
QE3 E8 –0.069 0.006 0.002  2.014 2.248 2.316 
E9 0.001 –0.020 –0.020 –4.102 –4.107 –4.766 
E10 0.051 –0.006 –0.002 –3.117 –3.293 –3.369 
DUBAI = oil price, QE1 = first round of quantitative easing, QE2 = second round of quantitative easing, QE3 = third round of 
quantitative easing, USRATE = yield rate on 5-year US Treasuries, VIX = index of global investor sentiment and market volatility. 
Note: Differenced data for VIX and USRate and log-differenced data for DUBAI were used. All variables were expressed in percent 
so that coefficients can be interpreted as percent changes. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
 
The effects of QE event variables on USRATE and VIX are clear: QE1 events lowered 
US long-term yield rates and reduced financial market uncertainty, although the effects of QE2 
and QE3 events are generally not statistically significant.12 In contrast, their effects on DUBAI 
are unclear: while the oil price fell on the E2 event week by approximately 10%, it increased by 
more than 20%, cumulatively, for the E3–E5 weeks.13  
 
A notable observation is that USRATE seems to contain an element reflecting the 
market’s anticipation of future business conditions in addition to an element that reflects QE 
effects. That is, optimistic expectations of the market about the future increases USRATE but 
decreases VIX simultaneously to generate a negative coefficient of USRATE in the VIX 
regression.14 This reasoning is reinforced by the DUBAI regression results. A rise in USRATE 
appears to increase DUBAI before VIX is included in the regression, but this result disappears 
once the effects of VIX are controlled. In contrast, the effect of VIX on DUBAI remains extremely 
significant both statistically and economically (a 1% rise in VIX lowers DUBAI by 34%) 
regardless of specification. In this regard, oil prices seem to have responded to financial market 
risks more than to US long-term yield rates, and QE contributed to the rise of oil prices to the 
extent that QE reduced financial market uncertainty. 
 
B. Effects of QE on Local Financial Variables  
 
To examine the effects of QE variables on Asia, similar regressions were carried out for three 
major financial variables: CDS (Credit Default Swap premium on 5-year sovereign debt); BOND 
(local currency denominated bond yield rate on 5-year government bond); and EXR (exchange 
rate vis-à-vis the US dollar) from eight Asian economies (the PRC; Hong Kong, China; Japan; 
the Republic of Korea; Malaysia; the Philippines; Singapore; and Thailand). As explanatory 
                                                
12  These results are consistent with the existing literature as discussed in Section II. 
13  This is different from the previous result reported by Glick and Leduc (2011) who found negative cumulative 
effects of QE events on oil prices. The different results may stem from the use of different frequency data: while 
they used daily data, we used weekly data. 
14  This result did not change when term spread data (e.g., 5-year Treasury rate—federal fund rate) was used. 
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variables, we included USRATE and VIX, together with QE event dummies, which we presume 
are exogenous to Asian financial markets. The three domestic financial variables from each 
country may, however, be simultaneously determined. An implicit assumption in this paper is 
that causality runs from CDS→BOND→EXR, i.e., CDS is included in BOND and EXR 
regressions, and BOND is included in EXR regressions. Although results differ across countries, 
they can be roughly summarized as in Table 3 (see the Appendix for detailed results). 
 
 
Table 3: Summary of Local Variable Regressions 
 
Dependent Variable CDS BOND EXR
Local Variables BOND   “0” 
CDS  “0” “++” 
Global Variables USRATE “0” “+++” “0”(i) 
VIX “+++” “0” “+++”(ii) 
QE1 (5 Events) “-” “-” “--” 
QE2 (2 Events) “0” “0” “0” 
QE3 (3 Events) “0” “0” “0” 
Notes: “+++”, “++”, and “+” indicate that the coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. “---”, “—”, and “-” indicate that the coefficients are negative and statistically significant at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. “0” indicates that the coefficients are not statistically significant. 
(i) “+++” for Japan and Singapore.  
(ii) “0” for the PRC and “---” for Japan.  
 
 
First, we find that QE1 events have pronounced effects on domestic financial variables, 
while QE2 and QE3 effects are relatively muted. Despite some exceptions, QE1 events 
generally lowered CDS, BOND, and EXR (local currency appreciation). The magnitudes of 
some QE impacts were sizable even after controlling for their indirect effects through USRATE 
and VIX15: for example, E3 lowered (appreciated) Asia’s exchange rates (except for the PRC 
and Hong Kong, China) by between 1.5% (Malaysia) and 5.6% (Japan). The finding that only 
QE1 has a significant impact on Asian currency values is in line with the existing literature as 
well as the eyeball tests that capital inflows recovered quickly after 2008 but did not show any 
further large increases after 2010. 
 
Second, the QEs were also likely to have influenced Asia’s financial markets through 
their impacts on global variables. With no single exception, Asia’s CDS premiums (particularly 
for emerging countries) were significantly lower when VIX was lower,16 and Asia’s BONDs were 
lower when USRATE was lower.17 To the extent that the QEs reduced VIX and USRATE, 
therefore, the QEs must have contributed to easing financial conditions in Asia.  
 
In contrast, the impacts of global variables on exchange rates substantially differ across 
countries depending on their exchange rate regimes and degrees of financial market 
liberalization. In general, Asia’s exchange rates are insensitive to the variations in USRATE, 
except for Japan and Singapore where financial markets are fully liberalized and exchange 
                                                
15  A notable result is that the impacts of QE events are generally reduced when VIX is included, implying that the 
impacts of QE events were also transmitted through the channel of lowering global financial market uncertainty. 
16  A 1% change in VIX leads to 0.6%–0.7% changes in advanced Asian economies’ CDSs (i.e., in Japan and Hong 
Kong, China), but more than 2% changes for most of emerging Asia’s economies, with the Republic of Korea 
having the greatest impact (3.6%). 
17  A 1% change in USRATE leads to 0.2%–0.3% changes in most of Asia’s BONDs, with Malaysia having the lowest 
effect (0.12%) and Hong Kong, China the highest (0.59%). 
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rates are floating.18 In contrast, Asia’s exchange rates are extremely sensitive to the variations 
in VIX, with the Republic of Korea being the most vulnerable.19 While the PRC’s exchange rate 
is robust to VIX, Japan’s exchange rate shows a negative sensitivity to VIX reflecting the safe 
haven role of the yen during the crisis period.  
 
Third, impacts of domestic variables on Asia’s financial markets appeared to be minimal, 
once the global variables were controlled for. The only surviving variable at the 5% significance 
level is CDS in the EXR regressions for Malaysia and the Philippines, perhaps indicating that 
these countries’ exchange rates were also influenced by country-specific risk factors in addition 
to the global indicator, VIX. All in all, however, the effects of country-specific factors are dwarfed 
by the global factors. 
 
 
V. HOUSING PRICES 
 
The results of Section IV suggest that explicit announcements on QE (QE1, in particular) 
directly affected Asia’s financial market sentiments. However, QE seems to have made further 
contributions to easing Asia’s financial conditions through at least two additional channels: (i) by 
reducing tail risks of the global financial market, which lowered CDS premiums of Asia, and (ii) 
by stabilizing the US long-term interest rate, which lowered Asia’s domestic interest rates. While 
inflation has been relatively stable in Asia notwithstanding easy liquidity conditions, asset prices 
(housing prices in particular) have sharply increased in some economies since the GFC, raising 
cautionary flags to regional policy makers. In real terms, housing prices nearly doubled in Hong 
Kong, China and India during the 4-year period from 2008 to 2012, and steadily rose by 57% 
and 27% in Taipei,China and Malaysia, respectively. Real housing price index in the PRC also 
skyrocketed until the first quarter of 2012, though it rapidly declined since then. 
 
 
Figure 9: Real Housing Price Index: December 2008–December 2012 
 
 
INO = Indonesia; HKG = Hong Kong, China; JPN = Japan; KOR = Republic of Korea; MAL = Malaysia; SIN = Singapore;  
THA = Thailand; TAP = Taipei,China. 
Source: CEIC Data Company Ltd.; Kookmin Bank.  
                                                
18  A 1% increase in USRATE is associated with 4.1% depreciation of the Japanese yen and 0.6% depreciation of 
the Singapore dollar, respectively. The coefficients for all the other countries were insignificant. 
19  A 1% increase in VIX is associated with a 22% depreciation of the Korean won and 11% depreciation of 
Singapore dollar. 
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With respect to the different exchange rate responses to the global shocks across Asian 
countries, an interesting observation is that economies with housing price hikes roughly 
coincided with those in which exchange rates have been stable or rigid. Housing prices have 
been relatively stable in countries with exchange rates that have been appreciating. Figure 10 
demonstrates the tradeoff between exchange rates and housing prices. Excluding Japan, the 
correlation coefficient between the two variables is –0.84, strongly suggesting that monetary 
easing in advanced countries after the GFC affected Asian countries through either appreciation 
of currency values or price increases in housing, the most important household asset in many 
Asian countries. Japan appears to be an outlier in this figure, but it is necessary to note that its 
currency value has rapidly depreciated since the fourth quarter of 2012 with the announcement 
of aggressive quantitative easing. In fact, if we limit the period up to the third quarter of 2012, 
Japan’s currency value had appreciated by 6% and would be well situated in the figure’s trade-
off relationship. 
 
 
Figure 10: Changes in REER and Real Housing Price Index: December 2008–December 
2012 
 
 
Note: HKG = Hong Kong, China; IND = India; INO = Indonesia; JPN = Japan; KOR = Republic of Korea; MAL = Malaysia;  
PRC = People’s Republic of China; REER = real effective exchange rate; SIN = Singapore; TAP = Taipei,China; THA = Thailand. 
Sources: CEIC Data Company Ltd. for the PRC; Hong Kong, China; India; Indonesia; Japan; Malaysia; Singapore. For the PRC, 
data from 2008–2010 refer to the average price of buildings in 70 cities; data for 2011–2012 refer to the average price of newly 
constructed residential buildings in 70 cities. As the former data series was discontinued after 2010, we generated a new index that 
spliced the former and latter data. For Thailand, data was collected from the Government Housing Bank, and calculated as a simple 
average of three housing price indexes (‘Single Detached House: Including Land’, ‘Town House: Including Land’, and 
‘Condominium’), whose trends are substantially different across indexes. For Japan, ‘TSE Home Price Index: Used Condominium: 
Tokyo Metro Area’ was used. The trends are all similar across various indexes for Japan. For Taipei,China, data was collected from 
Sinyi Realty Incorporation. For the Republic of Korea, data came from Kookmin Bank. 
  
 
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
It is a daunting task to identify the effects of US QE on Asia. The policies were taken when the 
global financial market was in turmoil, and thus a constellation of other factors simultaneously 
affected capital flows and financial markets in the region. The trend and regression analyses 
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conducted in this paper, nonetheless, seem to provide some insights on the impacts of QE on 
Asia. 
 
First, QE1 made significant contributions to the sharp rebound of capital inflows to the 
region after the global financial crisis. By reducing tail risks and lowering US yield rates, it re-
directed capital flows toward Asia, which suffered from US dollar liquidity shortage during the 
GFC period. In comparison, QE2 and QE3 effects appear to have been relatively muted. 
Second, the recent volatility of capital flows into Asia mainly stemmed from precarious portfolio 
investments, which does not seem to be unrelated to the abundant liquidity provision of 
monetary authorities in advanced countries. Third, housing prices in some Asian countries have 
sharply increased. This also seems to be affected by the prolonged QE policies and capital 
flows, as housing prices rose more in the economies where currencies have not appreciated.  
 
Considering the sluggish growth of advanced economies, loose monetary policies are 
likely to continue for a while. Together with the recent announcement of Japan of aggressive 
unconventional monetary policy in particular, the spillover of liquidity in conjunction with 
potentially volatile capital flows remains a risk factor to Asia. Unlike QE1, which was 
implemented in the midst of a global financial crisis, excess global liquidity with subdued risk 
aversion can cause aggressive yield search and larger capital inflows to Asia, where macro 
fundamentals are relatively sound.20 
 
Based on these observations, we provide three areas where Asian policy makers could 
directly focus on to avoid adverse implications from the QE of advanced economies. First is the 
need to strengthen macro-prudential policies. Although QEs of advanced economies have been 
extended, it is inevitable that these unprecedented and unconventional policies will have to end 
at some point in the future. To the extent that QEs have affected Asia’s financial markets, future 
unwinding will also have impacts on Asia, and adverse effects could be magnified in countries 
that have not prepared for such eventuality. Close monitoring of cross-border financial 
transactions (in particular, portfolio investment, which was most volatile around the GFC) and 
their implications on banking sector soundness is thus imperative. Where necessary, macro-
prudential policy must be strengthened. 
 
Second, improved monitoring of asset markets is necessary. In some Asian economies, 
housing prices have risen sharply enough to cause concern to policy makers. As proven by the 
recent GFC, bubbles in real estate markets are detrimental to financial and macroeconomic 
stability. Policy makers thus need to closely monitor potential risks in the banking sector that 
may trigger instability when asset price trends are reversed. 
 
Third is the need to maintain the size of reserves in line with the increasing volatility of 
financial flows. While it is not optimal for central banks to target exchange rates by market 
intervention, it will be prudent for them (especially the non-reserve currency issuers) to maintain 
sufficient foreign reserve holdings in line with the rising volatility of financial flows. This will give 
them sufficient buffer to cope with potential sudden reversals of financial flows.    
                                                
20  Its impacts on developing Asia will not be uniform across countries. For example, if QE of Japan succeeds in 
reigniting its growth, economies in developing Asia where Japanese companies are operating in large scale may 
benefit from FDI inflows from Japan. In contrast, economies competing with Japan in export markets can be 
adversely affected by the yen depreciation. 
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Appendix: Regression Results by Individual Country 
 
HKG: CDS data are available after 2009.7.1. 
 
 CDS BOND EXR
Const. –0.001 –0.004 0.001 
Local Variables BOND – – 0.047 
CDS – 0.086 0.211* 
Global Variables USRate 0.001 0.591*** –0.004 
VIX 0.687*** –0.100 0.851*** 
QE1 E1  
E2  
E3  
E4  
E5  
QE2 E6 0.002 0.016 –0.082 
E7 0.048 –0.067 0.037 
QE3 E8 0.010 0.058 –0.001 
E9 –0.003 0.009 –0.005 
E10 –0.050 0.004 0.014 
 
JPN:  
 
 CDS BOND EXR
Const. 0.001 0.000 –0.039 
Local Variables BOND – – –1.530 
CDS – –0.029 –1.328 
Global Variables USRate –0.015    0.172***    4.141*** 
VIX    0.664*** –0.040   –8.987*** 
QE1 E1 0.180*** 0.025 –1.815 
E2 0.000 0.059 0.054 
E3 0.008 –0.075  –5.591*** 
E4 0.069 0.023 0.310 
E5 –0.175*** 0.042 0.008 
QE2 E6 0.012 0.055 0.106 
E7 –0.009 –0.030 –1.339 
QE3 
 
 
E8 0.015 0.001 0.024 
E9  0.115** –0.031 0.624 
E10 0.023 0.009 0.787 
Note: (i) Differenced data for CDS, BOND, USRATE, and VIX and log-differenced data for EXR were used. All variables were 
expressed in percent.  
(ii) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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KOR:  
 
 CDS BOND EXR
Const. 0.000 –0.002  0.002 
Local Variables BOND – –  0.655 
CDS –   –0.107***  0.665 
Global Variables USRate 0.052    0.255*** –0.773 
VIX   3.606***  0.472*   22.157*** 
QE1 E1  0.311* –0.191  3.246* 
E2 0.162  –0.334** –1.475 
E3 –0.064 –0.213  –3.549** 
E4 0.078 –0.139 1.801 
E5  –0.360** –0.179   –5.990*** 
QE2 E6 0.043   0.325** –1.550 
E7 0.047 0.028 –0.182 
QE3 E8 –0.071 –0.029 –0.165 
E9 0.029 –0.033 0.005 
E10 –0.015  0.038 –0.791 
 
MAL:  
 
 CDS BOND EXR
Const. –0.001 0.002 –0.042 
Local Variables BOND – –   0.656** 
CDS – 0.024   1.281*** 
Global Variables USRate –0.072    0.115*** 0.086 
VIX   1.993*** –0.186   6.805*** 
QE1 E1 0.130   –0.344***   2.242*** 
E2 0.157 –0.032 –0.168 
E3 –0.087   –0.248***  –1.484** 
E4 0.048 0.096 –0.296 
E5 –0.232 –0.114 0.397 
QE2 E6 –0.011 –0.008 –0.546 
E7 0.002 0.006 0.051 
QE3 E8 –0.012 0.009 –0.215 
E9 0.043 –0.036 –0.204 
E10 –0.240* –0.003 0.738 
Note: (i) Differenced data for CDS, BOND, USRATE, and VIX and log-differenced data for EXR were used. All variables were 
expressed in percent.  
(ii)  *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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PHI: 
 
 CDS BOND EXR
Const. –0.009 –0.001 –0.039 
Local Variables BOND – – –0.038 
CDS – 0.024    0.745*** 
Global Variables USRate –0.099  0.328* –0.082 
VIX 3.528*** 1.163    6.833*** 
QE1 E1 –0.118 0.269 –0.413 
E2 0.062 0.061 0.469 
E3 0.023 0.162 –1.891** 
E4 0.212  –6.022*** –0.108 
E5 –0.023 0.183 0.167 
QE2 E6 0.006 0.091 –0.938 
E7 –0.118 0.028 –0.121 
QE3 E8 –0.009 0.016 –1.310* 
E9 0.077 –0.197 0.402 
E10 0.037 –0.071 0.364 
 
PRC:  
 
 CDS BOND EXR
Const. 0.000 0.001  –0.064*** 
Local Variables BOND – – –0.160* 
CDS – 0.082 0.150 
Global Variables USRate   –0.094***   0.211*** 0.123 
VIX   1.229***  –0.470** –0.087 
QE1 E1 –0.025   –0.330*** 0.031 
E2    0.213** –0.043   0.731*** 
E3 –0.033  –0.248** –0.401* 
E4  0.148 –0.064 0.037 
E5   –0.424*** 0.058 0.083 
QE2 E6 –0.051   0.317*** 0.052 
E7 –0.070 0.063 0.090 
QE3 E8 –0.029 0.019 0.044 
E9 0.024 0.007 –0.209 
E10 0.016 0.001   0.474** 
Note: (i) Differenced data for CDS, BOND, USRATE, and VIX and log-differenced data for EXR were used. All variables were 
expressed in percent.  
(ii) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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SIN: CDS data are not available. 
 
 CDS BOND EXR
Const. – –0.002 –0.057* 
Local Variables BOND – –  0.601* 
CDS – – – 
Global Variables USRate –   0.342***  0.573** 
VIX – 0.164 11.307*** 
QE1 E1 – 0.031 1.050 
E2 – 0.038 0.472 
E3 – 0.040  –3.638*** 
E4 – 0.105 0.922 
E5 –  0.215** –0.508 
QE2 E6 – 0.020 –1.133* 
E7 – –0.123 –1.036 
QE3 E8 – 0.019 –0.463 
E9 – 0.012 –0.178 
E10 – –0.056 0.292 
 
THA:  
 
 CDS BOND EXR
Const. 0.000 0.006 –0.060 
Local Variables BOND – – –0.060 
CDS – –0.052  0.503* 
Global Variables USRate –0.076*    0.341*** 0.344 
VIX   2.130*** 0.233  3.572** 
QE1 E1   0.482*** 0.160 1.440 
E2 0.167   –0.687*** 0.742 
E3  –0.297**  –0.323**  –1.947** 
E4 0.173 0.023 0.173 
E5 –0.199 –0.011 –0.227 
QE2 E6 –0.013 0.038 –0.649 
E7 –0.071 0.123 –1.291 
QE3 E8 –0.025 0.026 –0.208 
E9 0.041 –0.028 –0.504 
E10   –0.407*** –0.090  0.075 
Note: (i) Differenced data for CDS, BOND, USRATE, and VIX and log-differenced data for EXR were used. All variables were 
expressed in percent.  
(ii) *, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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